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In economies with weak enforcement of traﬃc regulations, drivers who adopt excessively risky be-
havior impose externalities on other vehicles, and on their own passengers. In light of the diﬃculties
of correcting inter-vehicle externalities associated with weak third-party enforcement, this paper evalu-
ates an intervention that aims instead to correct the intra-vehicle externality between a driver and his
passengers, who face a collective action problem when deciding whether to exert social pressure on the
driver if their safety is compromised. We report the results of a ﬁeld experiment aimed at solving this
collective action problem, which empowers passengers to take action. Evocative messages encouraging
passengers to speak up were placed inside a random sample of over 1,000 long-distance Kenyan minibuses,
or matatus, serving both as a focal point for, and to reduce the cost of, passenger action. Independent
insurance claims data were collected for the treatment group and a control group before and after the
intervention. Our results indicate that insurance claims fell by a half to two-thirds, from an annual
rate of about 10 percent without the intervention, and that claims involving injury or death fell by at
least 50%. Results of a driver survey eight months into the intervention suggest passenger heckling was
ac o n t r i b u t i n gf a c t o rt ot h ei m p r o v e m e n ti ns a f e t y .
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper reports the results of a ﬁeld experiment aimed at empowering individuals to exert pressure
on service providers. The speciﬁc context is that of long-distance road transportation services in Kenya,
where it is popularly believed that otherwise rational young males are transformed, Jekyll-and-Hyde-like,
into irrational death-seekers when they occupy the driver’s seat of a minibus, or matatu. Our intervention
motivates passengers to exercise their power as consumers, literally giving them a voice, by encouraging
them to speak up, to heckle and chide the driver when his behavior compromises their safety.
Individuals can be empowered to help themselves either by providing them with resources that tip
the balance of economic power in their favor, or by changing the decision-making environment in which
they operate in a way that increases their bargaining power or political clout. Although both types of
empowerment will likely be resisted - either by those who fund the resource transfers or by those who see
their own economic and/or political power eroded - they are often seen as potentially powerful development
initiatives that enhance not only the economic well-being of the poor, but their human dignity as well
(World Bank, 2004). However, some recent studies have examined the extent to which the poor exercise
the power conferred upon them: just as leading a horse to water is not enough to make it drink, mandating
empowerment (Banerjee et. al., 2008) might not induce the beneﬁciaries to seize control of their destinies.
The intervention in this paper motivates individuals to do just that.
Much of the recent literature on beneﬁciary empowerment has focused on its role in improving the
delivery of public services, particularly in the health and education sectors (see Bjorkman and Svensson
(2008), Svensson and Reinnika (2006) and Olken(2007)), many of which are free or highly subsidized at the
point of use. By contrast, this paper investigates the impact of consumer empowerment on the delivery of
a privately provided service that people pay for as and when they use it - long-distance road transportation.
In Kenya, large buses and smaller, 14-seater minivans, known locally as matatus, are the primary mode of
long distance transportation.1 Our study focuses on the quality, in particular the safety, of long distance
matatu travel. For a variety of reasons addressed below, the price mechanism might not be eﬀective in
ensuring eﬃcient quality in this market.
Long distance transportation services in much of the developing world are provided by the private sector
and account for a signiﬁcant share of road traﬃc injuries and fatalities, which in turn constitute a large
and increasing share of both deaths and the disease burden in the developing world. The World Health
Organization (2004) reported that 1.2 million people died from road traﬃc injuries in 2002, 90% in low- and
middle-income countries, about the same number as die of malaria. In addition, between 20 and 50 million
people are estimated to be injured or disabled each year. Road traﬃc accidents constitute the largest share,
23%, of deaths due to injury, nearly twice as many as the 14% due to war and violence combined. Traﬃc
accidents were ranked as the 10th leading cause of death in 2001, and are projected to be the third or fourth
most important contributor to the global disease burden in 2030 (Lopez et. al. 2006). By that date, road
accidents are projected to account for 3.7 percent of deaths worldwide - twice the projected share due to
1In the early days of 14-seater bus service, the fare for the most typical ride was three (tatu in Kiswahili) Kenyan Shillings.
2malaria (Mathers and Loncar, 2006).2 Given that the primary consumers of these services are prime-age
adults, reducing the extent of road traﬃc injuries and fatalities could confer large welfare gains on households
(see Mohanan (2008), Beegle et. al. (2008) and Evans and Miguel (2007)).3
Many interventions to reduce road accidents have been undertaken in developed economies, including
programs to reduce the volume of driving, to improve the safety features of road networks, and to enforce
road laws more eﬀectively.4 Publicity campaigns have focused on educating road users, and some, most
notably in Australia and New Zealand, have employed shock therapy to get their message across. For
example, an adverstising campaign in New Zealand aimed at reducing speeding and drunk-driving, and
encouraging the use of safety belts, was found to have an impact on road deaths (Guria and Leung, 2004).
Fewer studies of interventions in developing countries exist and while the results of these studies are not
causal, measured eﬀects are large. The introduction of speed bumps at certain accident hot-spots in Ghana
was associated with a 35% reduction in accidents and a 55% reduction in fatalities (Afukaar et al., 2003).
Bishai et al. (2008) found that higher intensity police patrols were associated with a 17% reduction in accident
rates in Uganda. Perhaps more creatively, in Bogotá, Colombia, mimes were used to ridicule pedestrians
and drivers who ﬂaunted traﬃcr u l e s . 5
In our ﬁeld experiment, we randomize an intervention aimed at empowering matatu passengers to exert
pressure on drivers to drive more safely. The intervention was simple and cheap: stickers with evocative
messages intended to motivate passengers to take demonstrative action - to heckle and chide a dangerous
driver - were placed in just over half of 2,276 recruited matatus. High rates of compliance were ensured
by running a weekly lottery among drivers of participating treatment matatus, who could win up to 5,000
Kenyan Shillings (about $60, or roughly one week’s wages) if their vehicle was found to have all stickers
intact upon inspection by our ﬁeld staﬀ. Our main outcome data were collected independently from four
insurance companies that together cover more than 90% of these vehicles, and who were unaware of our
intervention at the time it took place. We use insurance claims data for treatment and control vehicles in
the two year window bracketing the insertion of the stickers. We identify an impact on driver behavior
that is both statistically signiﬁcant and economically large: the stickers are associated with a reduction in
insurance claims rates of between a half and two-thirds, from an annual baseline claims rate of about 10
percent. Further, we ﬁnd that this result is largely due to a reduction in claim events where the driver
was at fault. We also document a large reduction in claims involving injury or death. We conﬁrm that this
eﬀect is associated with consumer empowerment and action by interviewing both drivers and passengers. In
particular, drivers of treated vehicles report signiﬁcantly more passenger complaints than drivers of control
2Country level data are generally less reliable. Odero et al. (2003) suggest that fatality rates in Kenya are extremely
high with 7 deaths from 35 road crashes every day, and that the impact of prevailing interventions is dismal. According
to a Ministry of Health Report, in 1996 traﬃc accidents were the third leading cause of death after malaria and HIV/AIDS
(Government of Kenya, 1996). More recent estimates suggest that over 3,000 individuals died in road traﬃc related incidents
in 2008 (Association of Kenyan Insurers, 2008)
3Road accidents aﬀect the elite as well as the poor. Recent example include the death in March 2009 of the wife of
Zimbabwe’s prime minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, the serious injury of then future Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki during the
election campaign of 2002, and the involvement of former Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi in a serious road accident in 2006.
4A comprehensive review of such interventions can be found in World Health Organization (2004), Chapter 4.
5This intervention, supported by the Mayor of Bogotá, Antanas Mockus, was not rigorously evaluated, but reportedly
enjoyed high levels of popularity (Caballero, 2004).
3matatus and conditional on experiencing a risky trip, passengers in treatment matatus are more likely to
express concerns to their driver.
Economists typically deem bad driving to be ineﬃcient because of the externality it imposes on other
drivers. Regulation of such behavior by a third party, such as the police, can correct this market failure, but
if the police are corrupt and themselves diﬃcult to monitor, a speeding ﬁne can be as much an opportunity
for extortion and a source of rents as it is a Pigouvian tax. In light of the diﬃculty of correcting inter-vehicle
externalities, the intervention we evaluate aims instead to correct an intra-vehicle externality - that between
passengers and the driver - generated by features of the institutional and physical environment that induce
drivers to adopt riskier behavior than passengers would likely choose. In lieu of the price mechanism, our
stickers encourage passengers to exert social pressure on the driver, literally heckling him to take account of
the costs that his actions impose on them.
Social pressure is eﬀective when it is social: when passengers coordinate on a particular strategy its
eﬀects might be proportionately greater. But non-cooperatively chosen actions can be ineﬃcient from the
point of view of the passengers, as when everyone sits silent hoping that someone else will chastise the driver.
Our intervention is aimed at lowering the costs of action, thereby (a) increasing the likelihood that eﬃcient
choices constitute a Nash equilibrium among passengers, and (b) when multiple Pareto-comparable equilibria
exist, providing a focal point that improves the chance of the more eﬃcient one being chosen.
Micro-ﬁnance institutions have relied on social pressure to improve loan repayment rates and proﬁtability,
by making self-selected, and hence relatively homogeneous, groups liable for loans.6 Similarly, in the political
domain, Gerber et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the prospect of disclosure of (non-) participation to an individual’s
household and neighbors, which they interpret as a form of social pressure, leads to higher voter turn-out.7
In the ﬁeld of public health, McGuckin et al. (2001, 2004) report results from an intervention similar to ours
in which patients were motivated to ask their doctors if they had washed or sanitized their hands. That
intervention shares the feature of empowering consumers to question authority with ours, albeit in a vastly
diﬀerent context, with positive eﬀects on provider performance.
In other contexts economists have succeeded in estimating non-zero eﬀects of social pressure, most notably
on the response of European football referees to home crowd biases (Dawson and Dobson, 2008, Garicano
et al., 2005). Although these careful studies identify statistically signiﬁcant impacts of social pressure on
referee behavior, as measured for example by the length of injury time granted, they do not appear to be
large enough to have economically meaningful consequences, in terms of aﬀecting the identity of winners and
losers. Within the environment of a 14-seater matatu, social pressure exerted by passengers on the driver is
arguably more benign than that exerted by football crowds on referees, and issues of favoritism and lack of
fairness, which are the focus of much of that literature, are turned on their heads. Indeed, our intervention
is aimed at giving voice to passengers in order for them to more eﬀectively exert the social pressure that is
ac o r r u p t i n gi n ﬂuence in other settings. In this context, social pressure is generated in a way that produces
6The empirical evidence in support of this contractual design is however mixed (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000,
Morduch, 1998, Pitt, 1999), and some MFIs have recently moved away from the strategy.
7A growing literature on collective action and ethnic diversity suggests that social pressure is relatively more eﬀective within
groups than between groups (see for example Khwaja (2008), Miguel and Gugerty (2005), Okten and Osili (2004) and Bardhan
(2000)).
4economically large and socially important beneﬁcial eﬀects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theory on how this intervention could
improve passenger action, and section 3 describes the context, data and empirical strategy. We present the
results of the intervention as well as evidence for the mechanisms in section 4, and conclude in section 5.
2 Modeling passenger behavior
A matatu driver acts as an agent of both the vehicle’s owner and its passengers. In the absence of any
agency problems, and assuming a well-functioning market for transportation services, we would expect the
quality of such services - as deﬁned by speed, safety, convenience, comfort, etc. - to be eﬃcient, reﬂecting
the marginal costs and beneﬁts of improved quality. In particular, passengers would get the safety they pay
for.
However, the relationships between drivers and both owners and passengers are fraught with agency
problems, in which case it might be diﬃcult for either party to reliably purchase safe driving. From the
passenger’s perspective, once on board s/he is, quite literally, captive and cannot expect to recoup her/his
monetary outlay if disatisﬁed with the service. In addition, the market is suﬃciently thick and anonymous
that it is diﬃcult for a given driver to establish and maintain a reputation for good driving.
From the perspective of owners, information on actual driver behavior is virtually impossible to observe,
so rewards for cautious driving are infeasible. Outcome variables upon which performance incentives might
be conditioned — such as crashes or oﬃcially recorded traﬃc violations — are characterized by low signal-to-
noise ratios. Making the driver the residual claimant in terms of liability for damage would expose these
low-paid workers to excessive risk, while conditioning wages on police reports of bad driving would likely
provide yet another opportunity for corruption.
On the other hand in practice, it appears that drivers are residual claimants with regard to marginal
fare collections: if anything, this could increase the incentives of drivers to drive recklessly, if it would mean
reaching a potential passenger ahead of other matatus. Finally, under Kenyan law, all public service vehicles
are required to have third party insurance, which further attenuates incentives for safe driving.
Self preservation arguably provides the strongest incentive for safe driving, although the behavior ex-
hibited by some drivers suggests it is not always operative.8 In any case, the fact that matatus are used
by a broad range of Kenyan society, across which incomes, and hence the value of life, vary signiﬁcantly,
suggests that for at least some trips the driver’s optimal point on the risk-speed frontier will not reﬂect
the preferences of his passengers. Paying the driver to slow down (or indeed, to speed up) is unlikely to
be observed, due both to free-rider problems among the passengers, and to the incentives the driver would
face for outright extortion. Instead, we suggest that passengers can aﬀect driver behavior through social
pressure: by adopting a “heckle and chide” strategy.
8An explanation consistent with these facts is excessive optimism about the likelihood of accidents (see for example Lovallo
and Kahneman (2003) and Camerer and Lovallo (1999)).
52.1 Passenger interactions
We model passenger behavior as a non-cooperative game in which admonition of the driver is costly to the
individual but has eﬀects, in terms of driver responses, that are felt by all passengers. We propose a simple
example in which two passengers, P1 and P2, play the following stylized game, in which each chooses a
strategy of either heckling the driver or remaining quiet. The passengers face identical costs and beneﬁts
of action. This game does not examine the strategic behavior of the driver explicitly, but simply assumes
some eﬀect of passenger actions on driver behavior.
P1\P2 Heckle Quiet
Heckle (∆ − c,∆ − c) (δ − c,δ)
Quiet (δ,δ − c) (0,0)
The private cost of heckling is c. This cost can be thought of as reﬂecting the ex ante expected embar-
rassment associated with speaking up, or the costs of counter-heckling from the driver or other passengers
who might not share a given passenger’s preferences. The eﬀect of admonition depends on how many people
engage in it - the more who heckle the greater the beneﬁt, in terms of safer driving. This beneﬁt, which is
a public good, is δ if one person heckles, and ∆ > δ if two do so. Note that as long as ∆ >c ,w h i c hw e
assume throughout, the pair of strategies (H,H) Pareto dominates the pair (Q,Q), from the perspective of
the passengers at least. Depending on the range of the costs and beneﬁts of heckling, three possible games
can be diﬀerentiated, with corresponding sets of equilibria, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1:
Game I: Prisoners’ dilemma (high heckling cost): if c>∆ − δ,t h e n(Q,Q) is the only equilibrium.
Game II: Coordination game (moderate heckling cost): if c<∆ − δ but c>δ,t h e n(Q,Q) and (H,H)
are both equilibria.
Game III: Prisoners’ delight (low heckling cost): if c<∆ − δ and c<δ, (H,H) is the only equilibrium.
2.2 Eﬀects of the intervention
T h es t i c k e r sw ei n s e r t e di n s i d et h ematatus could either increase the perceived beneﬁts of safer driving,
or reduce the costs of heckling. We admit both interpretations, in the light of apparent heterogeneity in
knowledge and experience of accidents. In a survey of passengers before the stickers were designed and
inserted, 11 percent of respondents reported that they or someone they knew had been in a matatu accident
in which an injury or death occurred during the previous month. On the other hand, 55 percent knew no-one
who had ever been in such a crash. Even though two of the stickers explicitly aimed to make passengers
think about how bad life could be for an amputee crash survivor, we believe an equally important eﬀect
of the stickers was to empower passengers, and to legitimize the expression of their preferences. This is
consistent with a reduction in the cost of heckling, c. In the model, passengers are homogeneous, drivers are
identical, and we assume there is no learning by either party. We discuss the implications for our empirical
results of relaxing these assumptions in section 4.
If the cost reduction associated with the stickers is big enough (so we move from Game I to Game III),
then the intervention simply switches the equilibrium from (Q,Q) to (H,H) (see Panel B of Figure 1 in
6the appendix). By reducing the cost of action, the stickers could induce a move from Game I to Game
II, in which case the set of equilibria is expanded from the unique ineﬃcient equilibrium to the pair (Q,Q)
and (H,H). Not only do the stickers make heckling an equilibrium, they could act as a focal point for
coordinated action. Finally, the stickers might induce a switch from Game II to Game III. This switch
removes the ineﬃcient pair of strategies (Q,Q) from the set of equilibria, leaving the unique equilibrium
(H,H). In all cases, the eﬀect of the intervention is to increase the parameter space over which eﬃcient
heckling is observed in equilibrium.
Although we do not model the strategic interaction between passengers as a group and the driver, we
note that the equilbrium of that game might be charact e r i z e db yn oh e c k l i n ge v e nw h e nt h ec o s t sa r el o w ,
if the driver knows those costs and understands that he can prevent heckling by driving safely. The actions
described in the passenger interaction games above could then be thought of as expressions of a willingness to
heckle — in the more complete game, we might not observe heckling on the equilibrium path, as it constitutes
a credible threat. We speculate that equilbrium heckling might fall over time as the driver learns about the
eﬀects of the stickers, even while driving performance improves. In addition, the eﬀects of message fatigue
or low sticker retention could attenuate these eﬀects. We investigate this possibility in our empirical work.
3 Context and experimental design
In this section we describe the salient features of the long distance matatu sector in Kenya to further motivate
the model we use to rationalize the impact of our intervention. We then describe the intervention in detail
and review the extent to which our experimental design was implemented in practice.
3.1 The matatu sector
There are perhaps 50,000 matatus operating in Kenya, providing both intra-city transportation in Nairobi,
Mombasa, Kisumu and other large urban areas, as well as inter-city services across much of the country.
Matatu ownership is broad, with many owners having ﬂeets of just a handful of vehicles. Those plying the
inter-city routes are organized into either Savings And Credit Co-Operatives (SACCOs), or limited liability
companies, which range in size from 20-30 to around 500 vehicles. These SACCOs and companies engage in
scheduling and other organizational activities associated with the provision of matatu services, and provide
ﬁnancial services to both owners and drivers. In our sample, about 70 percent of drivers operate a single
matatu on a long-term basis, while the others are either temporary drivers, or rotate across vehicles within
a particular SACCO.
Road travel options are diﬀerentiated by both price and some observable vehicle characteristics, including
the number and comfort of seats. Within the 14-seater matatu sector, quality diﬀerences are potentially
associated with reputations of particular SACCOs, reﬂecting marketing policies, driver recruitment and
training, vehicle maintenance, etc. Drivers are oﬃcially paid a ﬁxed daily wage and owners are responsible
for the running and maintenance costs of the matatu. A small fraction of owners were former drivers.
The eﬀectiveness of this intervention will depend in part on who consumes long distance services, how
7frequently they use these services, and their experience of road traﬃca c c i d e n t s . W es u r v e y e dp a s s e n g e r s
w h oh a dj u s tc o m p l e t e da ni n t e r - c i t yt r i pb ymatatu, and found that more than half had made a similar
long-distance trip in the last week, and 80 percent had done so in the last month. Furthermore, matatu
users are predominantly of prime working age, with two thirds of the respondents between the ages of 20
and 40. One third of the respondents reported feeling that their life was in danger on a matatu trip in the
previous month but half of the respondents had never experienced a life-threatening event. Heterogeneity in
passenger experiences underlines the importance of a potential mechanism of the intervention we evaluate:
increasing the salience of risky driver behavior.
3.2 Experimental design
Our empirical strategy compares outcomes of matatus in which stickers had been inserted with those of mata-
tus without such stickers. In our pre-recruitment survey we presented passengers with a variety of stickers
and asked which would be more likely to induce them or others to voice complaints directed to the driver in
the event of poor or dangerous driving. Three types of messages were presented to respondents: the ﬁrst
set had text-only messages (in both English and Kiswahili, the national language), in which individuals were
encouraged to take action; the second group of stickers included similar text messages, but with supporting
images with a “soft-touch”9; the third group represented fear stimuli, in which forceful messages about the
consequences of accidents were accompanied by explicit and gruesome images of severed body parts.
The results of the pre-intervention survey (not reported in detail here) indicated support for the eﬀective-
ness of both the fear stimuli and simple text messages, but not for the soft-touch approach.10 The chosen
stickers are shown in the Appendix. Stickers were placed on the metal panel between a passenger window
and the ceiling of the vehicle, ensuring that at least one sticker was within the eye view of each passenger
sitting in the main cabin. The stickers were not placed in direct view of the driver or the passengers in the
front cabin.
Although recruitment was at the individual driver level, we ﬁrst sought cooperation from the SACCOs
operating long-distance matatu services in Kenya, and obtained a letter from the management expressing
support for our project. The major towns among which our sampled matatus operated are illustrated in
Figure 2 in the appendix. In all, 21 SACCOs agreed to participate, and just three refused.11 At the initial
recruitment, participating SACCOs provided us with lists of license plates of vehicles in their ﬂeets.
In light of our initial recruitment experience, which revealed that vehicle lists were of variable quality,
and during which non-participation rates were observed to be reasonably low, at scale-up we simpliﬁed the
recruitment protocol and adopted a ﬁeld-based sampling procedure. Under this strategy, if a matatu had
been recruited at the pilot stage, it was again recruited and its treatment/control status was maintained.
Each additional observed matatus from a participating SACCO was eligible for recruitment, and assignment
to the treatment group based on the ﬁnal numeric digit of its license plate (odd = treatment, even = control).
9This category included subtle visual information such as a missing parent at a baptism or graduation.
10In future work we hope to be able to evaluate the diﬀerential impact of these alternative interventions, but due to sample
size constraints, the intervention we adopted in this study was a combination of what we projected to be the ﬁve most eﬀective
stickers.
11SACCO non-participation reﬂected the extent to which oﬃcials could act on behalf of a large group of owners.
8In addition, a follow-up survey undertaken soon after the pilot recruitment period found very low rates
of sticker retention among treatment vehicles. To address this problem, at the second recruitment phase
we implemented a weekly lottery that was to run throughout the remaining study period. All complying
treatment vehicles were eligible for the lotteries, and three randomly chosen winners were inspected by our
ﬁeld staﬀ.12 If an inspected matatu was found to have retained all ﬁve stickers, the driver would receive
a monetary prize: ﬁrst prize was 5,000KSh (about $US60), second prize was 3,000KSh ($US35), and third
prize was 2,000KSh ($US25).13
The structure of the project and its objectives, were explained to each driver, as was the voluntary nature
of his participation in the study.14 Each driver in the treatment or control groups was asked to sign an
informed consent form. Those selected to receive the treatment group were asked to accept all ﬁve stickers,
although compliance with this request was incomplete (see below).
Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix report descriptive statistics of vehicles and drivers respectively, for the
treatment and control groups by random assignment. These data suggest that the randomization performed
well, there being only one observable variable exhibiting a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
two groups. This one source of diﬀerence between treatment and control groups could however be quite
important, as it is the share of drivers who reported having had an accident in the last 12 months (second
last row in Table 1 in the appendix). Among those assigned to treatment the self-reported accident rate
was 1.5%, while among the assigned control group the rate was just 0.4%. However, when we consult the
insurance claims data, this diﬀerence disappears (see last row), suggesting that responses to this question
may have been aﬀected by treatment status. Indeed, drivers were administered the recruitment questionnaire
after they were assigned to the treatment or control group, and those in the treatment group may have been
induced to think more about their accident experiences, or even to exaggerate them. In any case, we do not
use driver reports as our main outcome variable.
Actual assignments to treatment and control groups were highly correlated with the randomization.
Table 3 in the appendix reports that about 84 percent of vehicles assigned to the control group complied,
and that the same share of those assigned to the treatment group took at least one sticker, with 68.5 percent
taking all ﬁve, and 8.0 percent taking just three (typically the three text-only stickers).
Imperfect adherence to the randomized assignments, either due to driver self-selection or ﬁeldworker
error, yielded some statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in characteristics by actual assignment, as reﬂected
in Table 4 in the appendix. However, the diﬀerence in self-reported accident rates that was signiﬁcant in
the true assignment was narrower in the actual assignment (the rates were 1.3% and 0.6% respectively).
Although we do not have a strong reason to believe that selection on the basis of those observables that
show signiﬁcant diﬀerences would bias our results, we check the robustness of our average treatment eﬀect
12At recruitment, we requested drivers provide us with their cell phone numbers, or a number at which they could be reached.
To increase the perceived expected winnings, the treatment group was divided into 5 groups of roughly 200 matatus each. Each
group’s lottery was run every 5 weeks.
13Implementing the lottery was challenging, particularly given security concerns in and around the bus stations. The winning
license plate numbers were randomly drawn oﬀ-site, after which one of our ﬁeld staﬀ would contact the driver and inspect the
vehicle. If it was found to be in compliance, another ﬁeld staﬀ member would be informed by phone, and would send money
via M-PESA, a cell-phone based money transfer system, to the driver. The driver would conﬁrm on the spot receipt of the
prize.
14Our ﬁeld staﬀ encountered no female drivers, although a number of SACCO executives are women.
9on the treated results with both intention to treat and instrumental variable estimation strategies.
3.3 Data and empirical strategy
In addition to baseline data collected at recruitment, we were granted access to a comprehensive database
of claims data from four insurance companies that cover over 90 percent of long-distance matatus in our
sample (see table 5 in appendix). Although we recognize that claims are endogenous, we do not believe
they would be systematically correlated with treatment status. These data were collected for the period
January 2007 through February 2009. We use annualized insurance claims rates as an outcome measure, as
well as evidence based on our own coding of the description of the accidents such as whether the driver was
at fault, and whether injuries or fatalities occurred. However the insurance claims data has some limitations
in that we do not observe whether the vehicle involved in the claim continues to operate after the claim. Our
simplifying assumption that each matatu continues to operate after an accident biases the result against us
ﬁnding an eﬀect of the intervention.
Our accident-related data were complemented by surveys of both passengers and drivers of treatment
and control matatus, ﬁelded in November 2008, about 8 months after recruitment. These surveys elicited
information about experiences on the most recent trip, and on trips taken during the previous week and
month. Reports by both passengers and drivers of the frequency of heckling, and by passengers of the
safety of trips, are used as outcome variables to examine the mechanisms by which the stickers may impact
behaviors.
We are interested in estimating the causal eﬀect of the sticker intervention on the outcomes outlined
above. Using outcome information before and after sticker insertion we estimate the following speciﬁcation:
Yit = α + β1Pit + β2TR i + β3Pit ∗ TRi + β4Xit + ηi + εit (1)
where Yit represents the annualized claim rate for matatu i during period t, Pit is an indicator that takes on
the value of 1 for all time periods after recruitment and 0 otherwise, and TRi is an indicator equal to 1 if
the matatu was ‘treated’ and 0 otherwise. Finally Xit represents a set of covariates that might include the
vehicle condition, and driver and route characteristics, and ηi represents unobserved ﬁxed characteristics of
the driver, route and vehicle.15
The main parameter of interest is β3 which captures the net change in the outcome variable Yit for
treated vehicles compared with those in the control group. A negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient indicates
a statistically signiﬁcant decline in the claims rates among treatment matatus. This estimate, and the
alternatives described below, likely represent lower bounds on the true value of the parameter due to potential
spillovers across treatment and control matatus.I f t h e e m p o w e r m e n t e ﬀect of the stickers on individual
passengers is durable, those who have been exposed to the treatment may be induced to heckle their driver
15Anticipating depreciation and fatigue eﬀects, a more general speciﬁcation is Yik = α0 +
P
k δkQik +βTR i +
P
k γkQik ∗
TR i +θXik + ηi +εik where Qik is an indicator taking the value zero/one if quarter k is before/after the treatment of matatu
i,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcients γk capture the time varying eﬀects of the intervention, post-recruitment. We present graphical evidence
of a decline in the eﬀect of the intervention where Yik is deﬁned as the likelihood of a claims rate in quarter k.
10in future trips, even when traveling in control matatus.16
Employing ordinary least squares, the identifying assumption for causal inference is that
Cov(TRi,ηi + εit)=0 . (2)
That is, we require that unobserved factors captured by ηi + εit are uncorrelated with the indicator for
treatment. As Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, this assumption appears to hold when TRi corresponds to the
random assignment rule. This deﬁnition of TRi yields the well-known intent-to-treat estimator b β
itt
3 .
An alternative estimator is the average treatment eﬀect on the treated, b β
tot
3 ,i nw h i c hTR i is deﬁned as
an indicator that takes on the value of 1 if the matatu actually has stickers and 0 otherwise. However, in
this case, the identifying assumption above is tenuous. In particular, it depends on the nature of compliance
to treatment assignment. As Table 3 demonstrates, 16% of matatus in the control arm did not comply with
their assignment. In addition, only 68% of matatus assigned to the treatment arm accepted all ﬁve stickers,
and 16% of them accepted none. In our TOT regressions, we deﬁne TRi =1if the vehicle accepted at least
one sticker. If non-compliance is random, then b β
tot
3 is a causal estimate of the eﬀect of the intervention on
the outcomes. However, if non-compliance is systematically related to unobserved factors associated with
unsafe driving, then b β
tot
3 is a biased estimate of the treatment eﬀect. Table 4 presents some suggestive
evidence that condition (2) might not hold, indicating that b β
tot
3 could exhibit signiﬁcant bias, although it is
diﬃcult to predict the direction of such.
Finally, under the assumption that compliance is endogenous to some degree, we present the results of
an instrumental variables strategy in which we use the indicator for random assignment as an instrument
for actual treatment status. The resulting estimator, b β
iv
3 , represents the local average treatment eﬀect of
the stickers on the outcome variable for the group of vehicles whose treatment status is aﬀected by random
assignment. In the results section below we present all three estimators.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Eﬀects on insurance claims
A visual summary of the results is presented in Figure 3 in the appendix, in which the trajectories of
claims events per 1,000 matatus are shown, from 4 quarters before, to 4 quarters after recruitment.17 Not
surprisingly, quarterly claims rates are very noisy, so that before recruitment we observe moderate albeit
insigniﬁcant diﬀerences across the treatment and control groups. As the ﬁgure demonstrates, while the
pattern of diﬀerence in claims rates by treatment assignment status oscillates before recruitment, it has a
consistent sign in the post recruitment phase. In particular, claims rates for matatus assigned to receive the
stickers are considerably lower in the quarters after recruitment.
16Similarly, drivers who move between treated and untreated matatus could be a source of spillovers.
17The horizontal axis in this ﬁgure measures time since recruitment, not calendar time. As recruitment took eight to ten
weeks, calendar time varies by vehicle. As of the time of writing, we were not able to obtain data on all recruited vehicles for
the fourth post-recruitment quarter. As mentioned earlier, we assume that vehicles continue to operate after an accident so
that the denominator remains the same before and after recruitment.
11An alternative way of presenting these results is to collapse the time before and after recruitment into
two distinct time periods and to compare the change in claims rates across these two time periods for both
treatment and control groups. The resulting diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate captures the causal eﬀect of the
intervention on accidents if the parallel trends assumption is satisﬁed (another way of stating the identifying
assumption in condition (2)). The results of this exercise can be presented in the form of two simple 3x3
tables, corresponding to the treatment-on-the-treated and the intent-to-treat estimators, respectively.
In the 13-15 month period before recruitment, the matatus in our sample experienced an average annual-
ized claims rate of 6.47%. Over the post-recruitment period for which we have data, the average annualized
claims rate among vehicles assigned to the control group increased by 3.17 percentage points, suggesting
that in the absence of the intevention the average claims rate in our sample would have been 9.64%.
As Table 6 in the appendix shows, even though claims rates increase signiﬁcantly after the intervention
for untreated vehicles, they remain constant for the treated. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator of the
eﬀect of treatment on the treated is equivalent to a decline in the claims rate of 4.46 percentage points.
If the identifying assumption of parallel trends is correct, the claims rate among treatment vehicles in the
post-intervention period, had they not received stickers, would have been 10.01%, so the reduction represents
a 45% drop in claims rates as a result of the intervention. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level,
with a p-value of 0.0075.
Because patterns of non-compliance to assignment could be systematically related to accident rates, we
repeat this exercise in Table 7, this time deﬁning TR i to indicate random assignment to treatment. The
ITT estimate is virtually unchanged from the TOT estimate, being 4.47 percentage points, or a 44% fall from
a projected rate among those assigned to treatment of 10.16%, and still highly signiﬁcant (p-value 0.0085).
A positive diﬀerence between b β
tot
3 and b β
itt
3 would suggest a pattern of non-compliance in which the more
risky drivers assigned to treatment opted not to accept the stickers and the less risky drivers assigned to
control accepted the stickers. However, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the point estimates
are the same.
Table 8 in the appendix restates these TOT and ITT double diﬀerence estimates (columns 1 and 3
respectively), but in addition presents estimates of the same eﬀects when SACCO ﬁxed eﬀects are included
(columns 2 and 4, respectively). The point estimates are virtually unchanged.
In columns (5) and (6) of appendix Table 8 we present the instrumental variable estimates in which we
instrument for actual treatment status using the random assignment. The local average treatment eﬀect of
6.5 percentage points is nearly 50% larger than the ITT estimator. Relative to the projected claims rate, the
LATE estimator suggests a decline in the rate of accidents of as much as 65% associated with the treatment.
While the usefulness of some IV results is legitimately questioned in the face of weak instrument problems
and heterogeneity, we believe our strong ﬁrst stage and high compliance rates make this a credible estimate
of the impact of the stickers. Nearly two-thirds of the accidents that would otherwise have occurred are
avoided.
In 278 of the 319 claims events in our data (about 87 percent) that we could classify,18 the matatu driver
is recorded as being at fault. Using these data, Table 9 in the appendix presents an ITT double diﬀerence
18Two claims had no accompanying descriptions that could be used for this coding exercies.
12estimate of the impact of our intervention on driver-at-fault claims. The point estimate of -4.10 percentage
points remains highly signiﬁcant (p-value 0.0070) and represents a 46% reduction in driver-at-fault claims
below the projected base.
Finally, the intervention we evaluate appears to reduce serious accidents. Our data include 206 claims
with at least one injury or death. Using this as an outcome variable, we repeat our ITT diﬀerence in
diﬀerences analysis in Table 10 in the appendix. Again, the point estimate of 3.35 percentage points is
highly signiﬁcant (p-value =0 .0079) and large, representing a 50% reduction in such accidents from the
projected base of 6.65 percent.
4.2 Sustainability
The eﬀectiveness of the stickers in solving the collective action problem we identify could vary over time.
The most obvious reason is depreciation of the stickers, which might be physically removed, or simply fade
and deteriorate with extended exposure to dusty country roads and repeated washing. But the stickers could
have some longer-term eﬀect on individuals who see them. The majority of the matatus in our sample are
operated by the same driver over time, so we might expect drivers to exhibit some learning, habit formation,
or other behavioral eﬀects of a long-run nature. On the other hand, the exposure of passengers to the
treatment is less uniform; at later dates after the intervention, some riders will be seeing the stickers for the
ﬁrst time, while others will have been exposed potentially many times, depending on the frequency of their
trips, and their use of treated and untreated vehicles. Observed behavioral change among passengers might
then be somewhat slower.
To illustrate the temporal eﬀects of the treatment, we present quarterly estimates of the diﬀerential
claim probability between matatus assigned to the treatment and control groups. Due to the low frequency
of events in each group, the standard errors we calculate for quarterly data are relatively large; nonetheless
we believe this exercise provides useful information about the sustainability of the intervention.
Figure 4 in the appendix shows the diﬀerential probability of a claim being ﬁl e di ne a c ho ft h ef o u r
quarters prior to the intervention, and the four quarters afterwards. While at this level of disaggregation
none of the quarterly diﬀerentials are statistically signiﬁcant, there is a clear, steady, decline in the magnitude
of quarterly point estimates post-recruitment. Matatus assigned to the treatment are about 1.25 percentage
points less likely to ﬁle a claim during the ﬁrst post-recruitment quarter (i.e., about 5 points on an annualized
basis). This falls to about 0.9 points in the second quarter, and 0.5 points in the third.
This ﬁgure oﬀers suggestive evidence of a reduction in the eﬀectiveness of the intervention. However,
based on our survey results eight months after recruitment, the reduction in the impact of the stickers appears
to match the reduction in the number of vehicles with stickers: that is, our evidence is consistent with a
situation in which the messages maintain their salience, conditional on remaining in view of the passengers.
As Table 12 shows, the share of matatus with all ﬁve stickers fell to about 40% of the number at recruitment
after eight months, which is consistent with the reduction in the quarterly claim diﬀerential over the same
period, from 1.25 to 0.5 percentage points, although our estimates lack precision.
Figure 5 in the appendix presents a similar pattern of declining eﬀectiveness post-recruitment, as mea-
13sured by the diﬀerence in probability of a claim being ﬁled in which the driver was at fault. Compared to
Figure 4, the decline is less steep over the three quarters for which we have complete data. Finally, Figure 6
in the appendix reports similar estimates for claims that involved either an injury or a fatality. The eﬀects
are smaller by this measure, and even less precisely estimated, although it appears the impact of the stickers
had all but disappeared by the third quarter post-recruitment.
4.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects
The mechanism by which our treatment might aﬀect driver behavior is potentially complex, as it involves
a number of decisions-makers. The simple theory described in Section 2 assumed a homogenous group of
passengers, and a positive and uniform response to heckling across all drivers. However, passengers and
drivers can each diﬀer in a number of relevant ways, suggesting plausible heterogeneous treatment eﬀects.
This possibility arises not only because individual passengers and drivers might exhibit heterogeneous un-
derlying characteristics, but because the characteristics of other agents are diﬃcult to observe. For example,
a passenger might be illiterate, so might be motivated little by the stickers; and even if he could read, he
might not know if the other passengers can read, and if his objections will be backed up. Similarly, the
reaction of the driver to heckling might depend on his personality, and the impact on the safety of the trip
could be correlated with this. Thus, “good” drivers might slow down in response to heckling, while “bad”
drivers might respond, for example, by overtaking more aggressively.
Finally, due to the strategic nature of the interactions among passengers, and between them and the
driver, the beliefs that individuals hold about the characteristics of other players are important. If a passen-
ger’s experience suggests to him that drivers in general are very likely to respond negatively to heckling, or
that other passengers are unlikely to join him, then irrespective of the costs of heckling, he will be cautious.
If, on the other hand, the passenger has little experience of the stickers, he might be willing to experiment
in order to learn about both the responsiveness of other passengers, and the reaction of the driver. Het-
erogeneity of underlying characteristics, as well as beliefs about those characteristics thus yield, at least in
theory, a myriad of potential eﬀects of the stickers on safety.
These observations have implications for the interpretation of our empirical results. In particular, a
positive intention-to-treat estimator does not imply a positive treatment eﬀect across the distribution of
passenger and driver types. Furthermore, to the extent that compliance to random assignment holds for a
subset of driver types, the instrumental variable estimate may correspond to the treatment eﬀect of a small
and in policy terms unimportant group of drivers. However, given the size of our ITT estimates, and the high
compliance rates achieved, these problems of interpretation do not appear to place signiﬁcant limitations on
our analysis.
4.4 Robustness of Treatment eﬀect
In this sub-section we present two robustness tests for the main results outlined above. In general, diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimates rely on the strong assumption of parrallel trends in the outcomes in the absence of
the intervention. If this assumption does not hold, the measured treatment eﬀect reﬂects trend diﬀerences
14between the treatment and control groups. Our randomization should have eliminated such diﬀerences, but
nevertheless we perform a falsiﬁcation test in which we create a synthetic recruitment date for every matatu
that is exactly one year before the actual recruitment date. Using insurance claims data for the two year
window around this synthetic recruitment date, we carry out a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation strategy
to examine whether there are trend diﬀerences between the treatment and control vehicles.19
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 11in the appendix. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate
for this placebo test is positive and insigniﬁcant. Additional evidence using a quarterly probit that examines
diﬀerences in the likelihood of quarterly claims is shown in Figure 7 in the appendix. This ﬁgure exhibits no
systematic diﬀerences between treatment and control matatus either before or after the synthetic recruitment
date. Both of these results suggest that the main results presented above are unlikely the consequence of
trend diﬀerences in the two groups.
4.5 Evidence on mechanisms of change
The theory presented in section 2 suggests that passengers traveling in matatus with stickers will be more
likely to voice their concerns over bad driving. To investigate if this could be leading to the observed
diﬀerential in claims rates identiﬁed above, we analyze data from a survey of drivers, plus up to three of
their passengers, in 284 vehicles ﬁelded in November 2008, about 8 months after recruitment.20 We face
two diﬃculties in detecting evidence for the mechanisms underlying our results. First, even if the stickers
are eﬀe c t i v e ,w em i g h to b s e r v el i t t l eo rn od i ﬀerence in heckling if drivers of treatment vehicles quickly learn
to adapt their behavior to minimize passenger complaints. On the other hand, whether heckling is observed
in equilibrium or not, we might expect passengers to report their trips as being safer in treatment matatus.
Secondly, given the rarity of traﬃc accidents, events that generate heckling will also be rare. Compounding
this power problem is the fact that, despite the weekly lottery, after 8 months many of the treatment vehicles
had lost some or all of their stickers. Table 12 in the appendix shows that, among our sample of 284 matatus,
the share with all ﬁve stickers had fallen from 44% at recruitment to 18% eight months later, and the share
with at least one sticker had fallen from 53% to 37%.
Table 13 in the appendix reports evidence of heckling from the survey of drivers and reports of passenger
safety ratings. The ﬁrst panel presents OLS coeﬃcients on two indicators, the ﬁrst indicating whether the
vehicle had received at least one sticker at recruitment, and the second that it had at least one sticker at the
time of the survey.21 The second panel presents results from regressions in which we instrument for both
accepting stickers at recruitment and having them at the time of the survey. We use random assignment
status at recruitment as an instrument for initial treatment, and the gender of the recruiting enumerator as
an instrument for having retained at least some stickers through November 2008. Our instrument for sticker
retention is disappoiningly weak, and our IV estimates are large and insigniﬁcant. However the OLS results
do provide some evidence of heckling. The eﬀect of stickers on driver-reported accidents since recruitment,
19In running this falsiﬁcation test we make the simplifying assumption that all matatus recruited between March-May 2008
were in operation throughout 2006 and 2007.
20We interviewed 306 drivers, but 22 of them were operating vehicles that had not been recruited earlier.
21The full impact of the stickers is thus the sum of the two coeﬃcients.
15reported in column (1), is in the right direction, albeit imprecisely estimated. However, columns (2) and (3)
show that compared to vehicles with no stickers at recruitment, drivers of vehicles with stickers in November
were 10.4 percentage points more likely to have experienced passenger heckling during the past week, and 6.1
percentage points more likely to have experienced it during the most recent trip. Joint tests of signiﬁcance
for these two indicators suggest signiﬁcant explanatory power for passenger helcking in the past week and
borderline signiﬁcance (p-value 0.11) for the most recent trip. These diﬀerences are compared with low
heckling rates in matatus without stickers, 5.6% and 3.8% respectively. Drivers of vehicles with stickers are
thus about three times more likely to report heckling.
Our results on passenger rating of the safety of the most recent trip in column (4) do not provide evidence
of drivers anticipating heckling and driving more safely. Passengers were asked to rank the safety of the
trip on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 denoting no danger and 10 denoting life-threatening. Nearly 45% of the
respondents who reported that they “could not say” were dropped from the analysis. We deﬁne a trip to
be reported as safe if the passenger reports a rating less than 4. About two thirds of all passengers in the
control matatus rated the most recent trip as safe according to this deﬁnition. As the OLS estimates suggest,
passengers in matatus with stickers are nearly 4 percentage points less likely to report a safe trip. While
t h es i g no ft h i se s t i m a t es u g g e s t st h a ts t i c k e r sm i g h tm a k ematatu passengers feel less safe (a salience eﬀect
consistent with one of the proposed mechanisms), it is imprecisely estimated.
Passenger reports of heckling have the potential to provide further evidence on the mechanisms that
might lead to our results. Sampled passengers were asked to report if they or any other passengers had said
something to the driver/conductor about reckless driving behavior. We divide the data into two categories
depending on whether at least one passenger had rated the safety of the trip as dangerous (a rating of 6
or higher). In addition to corroborating the mechanisms outlined, this dichotomy allows us to investigate
whether the stickers generate ineﬃcient levels of heckling when there are no risks of accidents.
Table 14 in the appendix presents the results of this exercise. Panel A presents the results for heckling
by any passenger, panel B presents results for heckling by the respondent, and panel C investigates the
likelihood of social pressure, that is, heckling by multiple respondents. Three estimates of the proportion
of passengers reporting heckling are presented for passengers in vehicles with no stickers at recruitment, in
vehicles that received, but no longer have stickers, and in those that had retained their stickers up until
the time of the survey. Among trips considered safe, passenger reports of heckling are common, with 50
percent of respondents reporting that a passenger had heckled the driver on the most recent trip in vehicles
that received no stickers. Heckling rates are very similar among vehicles that had stickers (44%) and those
currently with stickers (47%). Assuming that measurement error is not correlated with stickers (a strong
assumption given the content of the intervention), we do not ﬁnd evidence of excessive heckling in treatment
vehicles that had just completed a safe trip. Among those trips considered risky by at least one passenger
we ﬁnd evidence of a 50% higher rate of heckling among passengers in matatus with stickers (54% vs 36%
in the control).
Turning to panel B of the table, which reports the rates of heckling by the survey respondent him/herself,
we ﬁnd similar evidence for the lack of excessive heckling when trips are safe, and diﬀerential heckling when
trips are unsafe. In particular we ﬁnd that passengers in matatus with stickers are nearly 3 times as likely to
16heckle the driver as passengers in matatus with no stickers at recruitment. We note that the rate of heckling
among passengers in matatus that had stickers at recruitment, but no longer do so, is inconsistent with a
no-learning eﬀect of the stickers.
Finally we investigate the extent to which the stickers provide a focal point for more than one passenger
to heckle the driver. We deﬁne our outcome as the likelihood that two or more respondents heckled the
driver during the just completed trip. We do not know if such multi-person heckling occurred in response to
the same dangerous event, or if each heckler responded to a diﬀerent incident, so we cannot deﬁnitively say
if the reports correspond precisely to the kind of coordinated social pressure outlined in Section 2, although
we believe our results support this interpretation. The sample is divided into safe and unsafe trips, as above,
and the results are presented in panel C of Table 14. Again we ﬁnd no diﬀerences in multiple reports of
concern among trips that are considered safe. However, we ﬁnd large diﬀerences among trips considered
risky. A vehicle with stickers is nearly three times as likely as a vehicle with no stickers at recruitment to
have multiple responses of concern about the driver’s behavior.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented evidence that a very cheap intervention can overcome a potentially catastrophic collective
action problem in the context of long distance minibus transportation services in Kenya. Our estimates
consistently suggest that the intervention reduced the number of incidents leading to an insurance claim
by about a half. The intervention empowers passengers to question the authority of the driver when his
behavior endangers their lives. Our evidence suggests that by voicing their concerns in a coordinated fashion,
passengers exert social pressure that is eﬀective in discouraging dangerous driving.
Although the size of the eﬀect that we estimate is very large, we argue that it is nonetheless plausible.
Our intervention is neither intended to raise the ambient noise level in a matatu, inducing its passengers
to constantly heckle and interfere with the driver, nor to create a generally hostile environment inside the
vehicle. Instead, it allows individuals to overcome their inhibitions against voicing their fears in the moments
before a potential crash. These events, while tragically common, are still statistically rare, suggesting that,
even in the absence of dynamic eﬀects whereby drivers pre-empt heckling by driving more safely, heckling
will be observed relatively infrequently. Our evidence that driver- and passenger-reported heckling rates are
three times higher in matatus with stickers is consistent with our ﬁndings of a large reduction in the claims
rate.
Our results represent a step towards identifying the kinds of interventions that can tip the balance of
power in favor of consumers when the price mechanism is not fully eﬀective in guaranteeing quality service
provision. This is not simply a redistribution of bargaining power however, but a mechanism which allows
a small group of consumers to better coordinate their actions to ensure they get what they have paid for.
Solving the collective action problem among passengers represents a promising intervention to address a
rising problem of road traﬃc injury and fatalities in similar settings in other developing countries. In the
context of private provision among a diﬀuse set of owners and weak enforcement from the police, there are
no alternatives that have the cost and informational advantages of a passenger-based intervention. However,
17while we have identiﬁed such an intervention that is eﬀective, further research is required to determine the
optimal design of this approach. As in other arenas, the size of the treatment eﬀect is potentially sensitive
to the types of information and framing used (see Bertrand et. al. (2007) and Saez (2009)). Understanding
which content and framing strategies are most eﬀective in mobilizing passenger action is chief among these
questions. In future work, we hope to estimate the relative impact of evocative messages compared to simple
imperatives common in public health campaigns. This would have obvious implications for other information
dissemination programs such as anti-smoking, safe sex, and immunization campaigns. A second aim of future
research would be to gain a clear understanding of the duration over which such interventions are eﬀective,
and how frequently messages need to be updated.
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21Appendix: Stickers inserted in treatment matatus
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Hey, if he’s driving recklessly, will you arrive?
BE AWAKE.  BE STEADY.  SPEAK UP!
Hey, will you complain after he causes an accident?

























































Figure 1: Panel A: Costs and benefits of heckling and resulting equilibria.  Panel B: The 
impact of a fall in the cost of heckling on equilibria
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Post  0.0312  0.0320  0.0318  0.0326  0.0420  0.0430 
  (0.0154)*  (0.0124)*  (0.0173)*  (0.0141)*  (0.0113)*  (0.0091)** 
             
Treatment  0.0088  0.0107  0.0113  0.0103  0.0165  0.0146 
  (0.3873)  (0.3058)  (0.2673)  (0.3148)  (0.2674)  (0.3383) 
             
Post*Treatment  ‐0.0446 ‐ 0.0454    ‐0.0447 ‐ 0.0455    ‐0.0654 ‐ 0.0667 
  (0.0075)**  (0.0062)**    (0.0080)**  (0.0066)**    (0.0080)**  (0.0067)** 
             
Constant  0.0601  0.0393  0.0587  0.0394  0.0561  0.0371 
  (0.0000)**  (0.0034)**  (0.0000)**  (0.0032)**  (0.0000)**  (0.0117)* 
             
Controls for SACCO   X     X     X 
Observations  4322  4318  4322  4318  4322  4318 
R‐squared  0.0025  0.0167  0.0023  0.0167  0.0021  0.0162 











































































































































Treated At Recruitment ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.014 ‐0.038 0.065
  (0.013)  (0.033) (0.019)* (0.053)
  
Remained treated in  0.012  0.118 0.099 ‐0.105




Treated At Recruitment ‐ 0.224 ‐ 0.404 ‐0.562 ‐0.496
  (0.476)  (0.983) (1.109) (0.721)
  
Remained treated in  0.393  0.837 1.030 0.891
November 2008  (0.911)  (1.854) (2.101) (1.392)
  
  
Observations  259  259 258 418
R‐squared (OLS)  0.01  0.03 0.03 0.01
F‐stat stickers matter( OLS)  0.12  4.99 2.55 0.54




0.019  0.056 0.038 0.644
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Table reports the estimates of 
linear probability models of post treatment outcomes. Ordinary least squares are reported in the first panel while IV estimates are reported in 
panel B. Assignment to treatment is used as the instrument for treatment at recruitment while an indicator for female recruiter is used as an 
instrument for treated in November. The mean of the dependent variable shown is calculated for control matatus only. Sample restricted to 
matatus surveyed 8 months after recruitment. 
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Table 14: Testing for Mechanisms: Likelihood of self‐reported passenger heckling 
  No Stickers at Recruitment  Stickers Recruitment 
Panel A: Proportion of respondents reporting if any passenger expressed concern 
  None of the respondent report dangerous trip 
Sticker Retention  0.50  
No stickers in November   0.44 
Stickers in November   0.47 
  At least one respondent reports dangerous trip 
Sticker Retention  0.36  
No stickers in November   0.38 
Stickers in November   0.54 
Panel B: Proportion of respondents expressed concern 
  None of the respondents report dangerous trip 
Sticker Retention  0.23  
No stickers in November   0.22 
Stickers in November   0.17 
  At least one respondent reports dangerous trip 
Sticker Retention  0.12  
No stickers in November   0.29 
Stickers in November   0.33 
    
  
Panel C: Proportion of vehicles with multiple respondent expressing concern 
 
  None of the respondents report dangerous trip 
Sticker Retention  0.13  
No stickers in November   0.09 
Stickers in November   0.08 
    
  At least one respondent reports dangerous trip 
Sticker Retention  0.08  
No stickers in November   0.29 
Stickers in November   0.25 
Notes: Table reports the mean proportion of passengers reporting expressions of concern to driver/conductor by treatment status at the time 
of the survey. A sample of up to 3 passengers exiting each matatu surveyed 8 months after recruitment is used to construct these estimates. 
Passengers from 22 matatus that could not be matched to the assignment lists are dropped leaving a total of 785 passengers. Passengers 
were asked to rate the safety of the just completed trip on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 implies no danger, and 10 implies high likelihood of 
serious injury/death. A trip is considered dangerous if at least one responded reports a safety rating of 6 or higher. About 10% of matatu trips 
were rated as dangerous by this definition. 
 
 
 
 